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Abstract
The United States Supreme Court decided two trademark cases in its 2014-2015 term. The 
two cases are: Hana Financial v. Hana Bank,  and B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, 
Inc.  The Hana Financial v. Hana Bank  case dealt with the doctrine of tacking. The doctrine of 
tacking enables a trademark owner to claim priority in certain circumstances by tacking the 
date of the previous use of a mark on to a subsequent similar but new mark. By a unanimous 
opinion, the Supreme Court held that tacking is a mixed question of law and fact and that it is 
the function of a jury, rather than a court, to decide whether the use of an older trademark may 
be tacked to a similar but new mark. The B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.  case 
dealt with the doctrine of issue preclusion. The doctrine of issue preclusion prohibits ̶ subject 
to certain conditions ̶ an issue that has been decided by one tribunal from being reargued 
before another tribunal. The question in this case was whether a decision by the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board in a registration proceeding on the issue of likelihood of confusion 
would preclude relitigation of the issue in an infringement suit before a district court. By a 
7-2 majority, the Supreme Court held that the issue could not be recontested provided the 
necessary elements of issue preclusion were fulﬁ lled. This paper presents an overview of the 
applicable provisions of law and the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in the two 
cases.
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　　I.　Introduction:
　　The growing importance of intellectual property (IP) rights as a crucial element of 
competitive advantage in the international marketplace has led to an increase in litigation 
relating to those rights. In keeping with this, there has also been a sharp rise in the number 
of intellectual property cases taken up by the United States Supreme Court in recent years. 
However, in contrast to the ten IP cases heard by the Court in its October 2013 term, only ﬁ ve 
IP cases ﬁ gured on the Court’s October 2014 docket. Of these, two related to trademark law. 
This is somewhat remarkable because in spite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s increased attention 
to intellectual property law, the number of trademark-related cases have been few and far 
between. １
　　The two trademark cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in its October 2014 
term were: Hana Financial v. Hana Bank, ２ and B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, 
Inc. ３ The Hana Financial v. Hana Bank  case dealt with the doctrine of tacking. The doctrine 
of tacking enables a trademark owner to claim priority in certain circumstances by tacking 
the date of the previous use of a mark on to a subsequent similar but new mark. The question 
before the Court was whether a judge or a jury should decide the propriety of tacking in a 
given case. By a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that tacking is a mixed question 
of law and fact and that it is the function of a jury, rather than a court, to decide whether the 
use of an older trademark may be tacked to a similar but new mark. The B&B Hardware, 
Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.  case dealt with the doctrine of issue preclusion which prohibits 
̶ subject to certain conditions ̶ an issue that has been decided by one tribunal from being 
reargued before another tribunal. The question in this case was whether a decision by the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in a registration proceeding on the issue of likelihood of 
confusion would preclude relitigation of the issue in an infringement suit before a district 
court. By a 7-2 majority, the Supreme Court held that the issue could not be recontested 
provided the necessary elements of issue preclusion are fulfilled. This paper presents an 
overview of the applicable provisions of law and the opinions of the United States Supreme 
1 In the past decade, only two cases that can be described as “trademark-related” have been taken up by the 
Court: American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,   560 U.S. 183 (2010),  130 S.St. 2201(2010);  Already, 
LLC v. Nike, Inc.,  568 U.S. ______ (2013), 133 S.Ct. 721 (2013),  Neither case dealt with substantive aspects 
of trademark law. The three other IP cases decided by the Supreme Court in its October 2014 term dealt with 
patent law. They were : Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.,  574 U.S. ______ (2015); Kimble v. Marvel 
Entertainment.,  576 U.S. ______ (2015); and Commil U.S.A.  v Cisco Systems,  576 U.S. ______ (2015).
2 Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank,  574 U.S. ______ (2015).  Available at: 
  http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1211_1bn2.pdf.
3 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.,  575 U.S. _____ (2015).  Available at:
  http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-352_c0n2.pdf.
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Court in the two cases.
　　II.　Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank ４ :
　　The current statutory federal trademark law of the United States was enacted on July 5, 
1946, and is embodied in 15 United States Code Chapter 22. It is commonly referred to as 
the Lanham Act. Trademarks are also afforded a measure of protection under the common 
law of the various states. Such protection has existed since the colonial era. ５ The power of the 
United States Congress to enact federal legislation in respect of trademarks is based upon the 
power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause,６  and is only applicable in 
respect of trademarks used in interstate commerce.
　　The question at issue in this case was whether the propriety of trademark tacking ７  in a 
4 Supra  note 2
5 This was expressly recognized by the United States Supreme Court in its opinion in a 
  group of cases referred to as the Trademark Cases, 100 U.S.82 (1879). With reference to a previous attempt by 
the U.S. Congress to codify trademark law, the Court’s opinion stated:
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the 
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the 
exclusion of use by all other persons, has long been recognized by
the common law and the chancery court of England and of this
country and by the statutes of some of the states. It is a property 
right for the violation of which damages may be recovered in an
action at law, and the continued violation of it will be enjoined by
a court of equity, with compensation for past infringement. This
exclusive right was not created by the act of Congress, and does 
not now depend upon it for its enforcement. The whole system of 
trademark property and the civil remedies for its protection 
existed long anterior to that act, and have remained in full force
since its passage. 
100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879)
6 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S.Constitution.
7 The tacking doctrine is succinctly set out in the opening paragraph of Judge Callahan’s opinion for the U.S.Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Hana Financial Inc. v. Hana Bank,  available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/
datastore/opinions/2013/11/22/11-56678.pdf. 
The paragraph reads:
A party claiming trademark ownership must establish that
it was the first to use the mark in the sale of goods or services.
This concept is known as trademark “priority.” One of the ways
that a party may establish priority is through the constructive
use doctrine known as “tacking.” Tacking allows a party to 
“tack” the date of the user’s first use of a mark onto a 
subsequent mark to establish priority where the two marks are 
so similar that consumers would generally regard them as being
the same. 
With specific reference to the Ninth Circuit in which the present case was tried, the opinion goes on to state in 
the second paragraph:
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given case should be decided by a judge or by a jury.
　　Hana Financial, a California corporation, was incorporated on August 15, 1994. Hana Bank 
was established in South Korea in 1971. In 1991, Hana Bank was exploring the possibility of 
extending its services through a partner in the United States. In pursuance of this plan, the 
principal of Hana Bank had had talks with two representatives of an American bank who later 
served as principals of Hana Financial. For various reasons, the deal was not eﬀ ectuated.
　　In May 1994, Hana Bank acted in pursuance of its earlier plan, and established the Hana 
Overseas Korean Club. Its primary aim was to provide ﬁ nancial services to Korean Americans. 
To that end, in July 1994, Hana Bank advertised its services extensively in Korean language 
newspapers in the United States. Both names ‒ Hana Bank and Hana Overseas Korean Club ‒ 
along with the Hana Bank logo appeared in the advertisements and the application forms for 
the services.
　　Hana Financial was established a month after Hana Bank’s U.S. advertisements first 
appeared. It started using its trademark on April 1, 1995 and got a federal trademark 
registration for its logo bearing, inter alia, the name Hana Financial in respect of specific 
ﬁ nancial services. Hana Financial, too, advertised its services in Korean and English language 
newspapers and on TV. 
　　In 1995, the principals of Hana Financial and Hana Bank, who had been acquainted for a 
while, talked about the use of the word “Hana” by Hana Financial. Hana Financial’s principal 
assured Hana Bank’s principal that Hana Financial would engage only in specific financial 
services, and would not be providing any banking services, and thus there was no possibility of 
any competitive encroachment.
　　Hana Bank, provided its services until 2000 under the name of Hana Overseas Korean 
Club. In 2000, Hana Bank changed the name of the club to “Hana World Center.” In 2001, 
Hana Bank tried to get its trademark registered but could not do so. Part of the reason for the 
refusal was the existence of Hana Financial’s trademark. Attempts to resolve the matter were 
of no avail. Hana Bank began conducting business in New York in 2002 using its own name.
We have previously indicated that tacking only applies in
“exceptionally narrow” circumstances, Brookfield Communications,  
Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,  174 F. 3d 1036, 1047 
(9th Cir. 1999), and is properly resolved “as a matter of law if 
reasonable minds cannot differ and the evidence permits only
one conclusion,” One Industries, LLC v. O’Neal Distribution, Inc.,  
578 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, the rule in our
our circuit is that tacking “requires a highly fact-sensitive 
inquiry” generally reserved for the jury.
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　　Hana Financial instituted a trademark infringement suit against Hana Bank in March 
2007. Hana Bank counterclaimed seeking cancellation of Hana Financial’s trademark by 
reason of Hana Financial’s knowledge of Hana Bank’s prior use, and on the grounds of laches 
and unclean hands. In January 2008, the district court issued a summary judgment on the 
issue of infringement, ruling in favor of Hana Bank on the basis of trademark priority. It also 
ruled by summary judgment in favor of Hana Financial regarding Hana Bank’s cancellation 
counterclaim. Both Hana Financial and Hana Bank appealed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the issue of trademark priority and remanded 
for trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment on the cancellation 
counterclaim.
　　On remand, Hana Financial sought an in limine order on motion seeking to exclude Hana 
Bank’s evidence on the issue of tacking. The motion was denied. The question of trademark 
infringement was to be decided by jury. The court also sought an advisory verdict from the jury 
on the the issues of laches and unclean hands. The district court’s jury instructions explained 
the issue of tacking thus:
　“A party may claim priority in a mark based on the ﬁ rst
　use date of a similar but technically distinct mark where
　the previously used mark is the legal equivalent of the
　mark in question or indistinguishable therefrom such 
　that consumers consider both as the same mark. This is
　called “tacking.” The marks must create the same,
　continuing commercial impression, and the later mark
　should not materially diﬀ er from or alter the character 
　of the mark attempted to be tacked.” ８ 
　　The jury found in favor of Hana Bank on the issue of prior use. It also found in favor 
of Hana Bank on the issue of laches. The district court later ruled in favor of Hana Bank 
on the issues of laches and unclean hands. Hana Financial then moved the district court 
anew for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. The motions were denied. Hana 
Financial appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court 
of Appeals noted that in the Ninth Circuit, tacking was a question of fact triable by jury, in 
contradistinction to a question of law as in some other circuits. For it to be treated as a matter 
of law in the Ninth Circuit, the evidence would have to be so strong that it could be amenable 
to only one conclusion. Such was not the situation on the facts of the present case. On the 
8 Reproduced in the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, available at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/14pdf/13-1211_1bn2.pdf, at internal page 3.
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footing that the jury’s decision was not unreasonable, the Court of Appeals aﬃ  rmed the district 
court’s denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law and upheld the jury verdict. On 
Hana Financial's petition, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. The issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether the question of tacking should be decided by a judge or a jury. 
The Supreme Court aﬃ  rmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
　　The Supreme Court delivered its opinion on January 21, 2015. The opinion was authored 
by Justice Sotomayor on behalf of a unanimous Court.   In its opinion, the Court noted that 
the general rule adopted by lower courts has 
been that two marks may be tacked when 
the original and revised marks are “legal equivalents.”
This term refers to two marks that “create the same,
continuing commercial impression” so that consumers
“consider both as the same mark.”
Van Dyne - Crotty, Inc.,  926 F.2d, at 1159
(internal quotation marks omitted). ９
　　The Court’s opinion emphasized that the applicability of the tacking doctrine turned 
essentially upon the “commercial impression” that the marks in question made upon 
“consumers.” １０ This, the Court opined, was a question to be decided by the jury. １１ The only 
exceptions would be when the facts warrant a summary judgment or a judgment as a matter of 
law, or the parties request a bench trial. １２
　　The Court rejected the four principal arguments advanced by Hana Financial. １３  Firstly, 
Hana Financial argued that the tacking doctrine is applicable only when the marks in question 
are “legal equivalents,” and therefore involved the application of a legal standard. The Court, 
however, opined that tacking involved a mixed question of fact and law, which is properly tried 
by the jury. 
　　Secondly, Hana Financial argued that a decision regarding a tacking question would serve 
as a legal precedent for other tacking disputes. The Court opined that a jury verdict on a 
tacking question was no diﬀ erent from that in any other area of law.
　　Thirdly, Hana Financial argued that jury verdicts on the question of tacking would make 
the justice system unpredictable. Again, the Court opined that jury verdicts in tacking questions 
9 Id.,  at internal pages 3 and 4. The court, here, was referring to Van Dyne - Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard  Corp., 826 
F.2d 1156 (C.A.Fed.1991). The Court further cited other supporting cases.
10 Id.,  at internal pages 3 and 4.
11 Id.,  at internal page 4.
12 Id.,  at internal page 5.
13 Set out in Section III of the Court’s opinion, id.,  at internal pages 5 to 10.
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were no diﬀ erent from such verdicts in other areas of law.
　　Finally, Hana Financial argued that tacking questions have historically been decided by 
judges. The Court, however, rejected this argument because the precedents relied upon by 
Hana Financial only related to speciﬁ c instances where a tacking question could ̶ the Court 
noted ̶ be properly decided by a judge.　　The precedents cited did not negate the Court’s 
conclusion that apart from speciﬁ c instances, tacking is a question that is properly decided by 
a jury. 
　　III.　B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. : １４
　　The question before the United Supreme Court was whether a decision of the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board in a registration proceeding relating to the issue of “likelihood of 
confusion” would trigger issue preclusion in a trademark infringement suit before the United 
States District Court. That is, would the TTAB’s decision preclude the relitigation of the 
likelihood-of-confusion issue in the trademark infringement action? １５
　　This case called into play numerous provisions of the Lanham Act, notably relating 
to registration of trademarks and the remedies for infringement thereof. Some of the key 
provisions specifically mentioned in the opinion of the Supreme Court are: 15 U.S.Code § 
14 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.,  575 U.S. ____ (2015).  Available at:
  http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-352_c0n2.pdf.
15 The Supreme Court’s description of the issue preclusion doctrine is set out in the opening paragraph of the 
Court’s judgment. It reads:
Sometimes two different tribunals are asked to decide the same issue. When that happens, the decision 
of the first tribunal usually must be followed by the second, at least if the issue is really the same. 
Allowing the same issue to be decided more than once wastes litigants’ resources and adjudicators’ 
time, and it encourages parties who lose before one tribunal to shop around for another. The doctrine 
of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is designed to prevent this from occurring. 
Id.,  at internal page 1.
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§1051(a)(2), １６ 1052(d), １７
1057 (b), １８ (1062), １９ 1063 (a), ２０ 1065, ２１ 1067 (a), (b) ２２, 1071, 1071 (b), ２３.§1072, ２４ 
16 The relevant part of 15 U.S.C. 1051 reads:
(a) Application for use of trademark
(1) The owner of a trademark used in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the 
principal register hereby established…
(2) The application shall include specification of the applcant’s domicile and citizenship, the date of 
the applicant’s first use of the mark, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark in commerce, 
the goods in connection with which the mark is used and a drawing of the mark. 
(3) The statement shall be verified by the applicant and specify
that -- 
(A)...(B)...(C)...
(D) to the best of the verifier’s knowledge and belief, no other person has the right to use such mark 
in commerce either in the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, 
when used on or in connection with the goods of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive...
(The section, here, sets out certain exceptions.)
17 The relevant part of15 U.S.C. 1052 reads:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others 
shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it ‒ 
…
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and 
Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not 
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive...
(The section, here, sets out a detailed proviso.)
18 The relevant part of 15 U.S.C. 1057 reads: Certificates of Registration
(a) Issuance and form  
(b) Certificate as prima facie evidence A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal 
Provided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of 
the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right 
to use the registered mark in commerce or in connection with the goods or services specified in the 
certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated in the certificate.
19 15 U.S.C. 1062 deals with the publication of a mark in the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office.
20 The relevant part of 15 U.S.C. 1063 reads:
(a)Any person who believes that he would be damaged by registration of a mark upon the principal 
register … may …file an opposition in the Patent and Trademark Office, stating the grounds therefor, 
within thirty days after the publication under subsection (a) of section 1062 of this title of the mark 
sought to be registered.
21 The relevant part of 15 U.S.C. 1065 provides that “[T]he right of the owner to use such registered mark in 
commerce for the goods or services on or in connection with which such registered mark has been in continuous 
use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date of such registration and is still in commerce, shall be 
incontestable.”
22 The provisions of 15 U.S.C. 1067 deal, inter alia, with opposition to registration and composition of the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
23 The provisions of 15 U.S.C. 1071 deal with appeals from decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to 
the United States Court of Appeals to the Federal Circuit or, in the alternative, seeking remedy by way of a civil 
action.
24 15 U.S.C. 1072 provides that the “[r]egistration of a mark on the principal register shall be constructive notice 
of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”
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1114 (1)(a), ２５ 1115 (b), ２６ and1125 (a)(1)(A). ２７
　　B&B Hardware, Inc. (B&B) owned the trademark SEALTIGHT. Hargis Industries, Inc. 
(Hargis) owned the trademark SEALTITE. Both companies manufacture metal fasteners, albeit 
for use in separate and distinct industries. B&B got its trademark registered in 1993 in respect 
of speciﬁ ed hardware. Hargis applied for registration of its trademark in 1996 in respect of 
diﬀ erent hardware. B&B opposed registration on the ground that the marks were so similar 
as to be likely to cause confusion, even though the mark pertained to diﬀ erent goods. This set 
oﬀ  a myriad series of actions inter se between the two parties, both before the United States 
Patent and Trademark Oﬃ  ce (USPTO) as well as the federal courts. 
　　In consequence of one of these various legal actions, Hargis’s mark was published in the 
USPTO’s oﬃ  cial gazette. B&B opposed before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) 
on the ground of likelihood of confusion. The TTAB upheld B&B’s contention and held that 　
Hargis’s mark could not be registered. In doing so, the TTAB applied some of the applicable 
factors in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis. ２８ Hargis had the option of either seeking review 
of the TTAB’s decision before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or by 
ﬁ ling a de novo registration action before the United States District Court. Hargis did neither. 
　　A concurrent trademark infringement suit ﬁ led by B&B against Hargis had been pending 
before the district court when the TTAB ruled in favor of B&B. Thereupon, B&B contended 
in the district court that the TTAB’s ruling on the likelihood-of-confusion issue precluded the 
relitigation of that issue before the district court. The district court rejected this argument 
and held that the TTAB’s decision had no preclusive effect as it was an agency and not a 
court within the scope of Article III of the U.S. constitution.  Following this, the jury found no 
likelihood of confusion and returned a verdict in favor of Hargis. The district court entered 
judgment based on the jury’s verdict. B&B appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit which affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied issue 
preclusion but on diﬀ erent grounds. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals tentatively recognized 
that an administrative agency decision could be a ground for issue preclusion, but nevertheless 
denied it in this case for three other reasons. Firstly, the criteria upon which the TTAB based 
its likelihood of confusion analysis for the purposes of registration was different from that 
25 The provisions of 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a) deal with remedies for infringement of a registered trademark.
26 The provisions of 15 U.S.C. deal with the evidentiary effect of registration on the principal register and the 
defenses in respect thereof.
27 The provisions of this section deal with remedies for infringement of an unregistered trademark.
28 The factors were first set out in In re: E.I.DuPont De Nemours& Co.,  476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 
1973).
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used by the Eighth Circuit for the purposes of an infringement action. ２９　 Second, the TTAB 
had overemphasized the appearance and the spoken sound of the products without due regard 
for the context of the marketplace, which was a critical element of an infringement action. And 
thirdly, the burden of persuasion in the registration and infringement actions were diﬀ erent.
　　B&B filed a petition for certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court. Following a grant 
of certiorari, the Court reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals and 
remanded for further proceedings.
　　The Supreme Court delivered its opinion on March 24, 2015. Justice Alito authored the 
7-2 majority opinion of the Court, with a separate concurring opinion being ﬁ led by Justice 
Ginsburg. Justice Thomas ﬁ led a dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia joined.
　　The Supreme Court dealt comprehensively with all the arguments against issue preclusion. 
Firstly, the Supreme Court supported the Eighth Circuit’s reluctance to accept the district　
court’s refusal of issue preclusion on the ground that the TTAB is not an Article III court. 
Relying on Supreme Court precedents and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the Court 
held that the doctrine of issue preclusion can apply even where one forum is an administrative 
agency and the other is a court. Also based on the Court’s precedents, the constitutional right 
to a jury trial embodied in the Seventh Amendment and the provisions of Article III would not 
impede the applicability of issue preclusion.
　　The Court held that neither the text nor the structure of the Lanham Act forbade the 
applicability of issue preclusion in the context of the facts of this case. Although the Act 
provided for judicial review of TTAB registration decisions, it could not be construed to mean 
that Congress intended to deny preclusive effect to unreviewed TTAB decisions just as an 
unchallenged court decision would trigger issue preclusion notwithstanding the fact that 
it was amenable to a de novo review. A district court reviewing a TTAB decision would, of 
course, not be bound by the doctrine of issue estoppel. But this principle would not apply in 
an independent proceeding like the one in the present case. Issue estoppel would apply to 
decisions of courts as well as agencies. In the absence of any clear evidence that Congress 
intended that TTAB decisions be denied preclusive effect, the argument that denying such 
eﬀ ect would help to streamline the registration process would be of no avail. Although many 
registration decisions may fall short of fulﬁ lling the necessary conditions for issue preclusion, 
there cannot be a blanket rule denying preclusive eﬀ ect even where the conditions are fulﬁ lled. 
　　The Supreme Court then turned to the grounds on which the Eighth Circuit had based 
its judgment. With reference to the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that it used different factors 
29 The Eighth Circuit used a different set of factors listed in Squirt Co. v. Seven-Up Co.,  628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th 
Cir. 1980), for evaluating likelihood of confusion in an infringement action.
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in its likelihood-of-confusion analysis, the Court noted that although the relevant statutory 
provisions were diﬀ erent, the applicable standard for assessing likelihood of confusion was the 
same in respect of both registration as well as infringement. The factors used by the TTAB in 
its analysis in the registration action were not radically diﬀ erent from the factors considered 
by the court in the infringement action. Moreover, since federal law provides for a single 
standard, minor variations in the application of that standard cannot confer on a party the 
right to relitigate an already decided issue before a diﬀ erent tribunal. In the Court’s opinion, 
there were three reasons for concluding that the likelihood-of-confusion standard for purposes 
of both registration and infringement was the same. For one thing, the essential wording of the 
applicable provisions were the same. For another, the likelihood-of-confusion statutory wording 
of the Lanham Act is a critical element of the trademark registration process. And finally, 
since the same district court can concurrently adjudicate both infringement and registration 
disputes, it is unlikely that two diﬀ erent standards would be used to assess the two questions. 
Hargis’s contention that the wording of the registration and infringement provisions of the 
Lanham Act are not the same may justify a refusal to apply issue preclusion in many cases but 
cannot shut out the applicability of the doctrine in all conceivable cases. Although the usages 
under consideration before the TTAB may be different from those before the district court, 
it does not necessary entail the application of diﬀ erent standards by the two tribunals. If the 
usages are the same, then the issue will be the same. If the usages are materially diﬀ erent then 
the issue may be diﬀ erent and thereby the resultant decision will not have preclusive eﬀ ect. 
　　With reference to the overemphasis on the appearance and spoken sounds of the marks, 
the Supreme Court held that judicial review is the proper means for redressal of this grievance. 
It cannot be a ground for denying issue preclusion. 
　　In response to Hargis’s argument that the procedures followed in the TTAB are diﬀ erent 
from those followed by the district court, the Supreme Court held that that by itself would not 
negate issue preclusion unless the procedures followed in the former forum were patently 
deﬁ cient. It could not be so said of the TTAB procedures, which are substantially the same as 
those of the federal court. 
　　So also, the Supreme Court concluded that the burden of persuasion in the TTAB 
registration proceeding was the same as the burden of proof in the infringement suit before 
the district court. 
　　Finally, Hargis contended that the stakes in a registration proceeding are substantially 
lower than the stakes in an infringement suit, and therefore the earnestness with which 
parties press their claims before the two tribunals would also be different. For that reason, 
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too. ̶ it was urged ̶ TTAB decisions should not have preclusive eﬀ ect in infringement suits 
in the district courts. The Supreme Court rejected this attempt to downplay the importance 
of registration, and asserted that the provisions of the Lanham Act in fact point to its highest 
importance. 
　　On the basis of the foregoing reasoning, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit 
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings with the directive that the rule to be 
followed by the court on remand should be: “So long as the other ordinary elements of issue 
preclusion are met, when the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the same as those 
before the district court, issue preclusion should apply.” ３０
　　IV.Conclusion:
　　Whether or not the Court’s opinions in Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank  and B&B 
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc..  are precursors of further attention to trademark 
cases in the coming years, the two cases are significant particularly because of the paucity 
of such cases being decided by the Supreme Court. They served to resolve splits among 
the federal circuit courts in respect of the questions at issue in the two cases. Thereby the 
understanding and application of the doctrines of tacking and issue preclusion will be made 
consistent among federal courts in the various states. By holding that a jury is the appropriate 
decision-maker in questions relating to tacking, the Court implicitly recognized the importance 
of consumer understanding in matters relating to trademark law, although the opinion does 
not say so in terms. The primacy accorded to the jury in such matters is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s recent disinclination to accord special status to intellectual property law 
cases. Also pointing in that direction is the Court’s insistence on applying the general standard 
rules for issue preclusion in respect of trademark law issues arising before the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board and the federal district courts. 
30 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., supra note 3, at internal page 22.
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要約
アメリカ合衆国最高裁は 2014 年－ 2015 年期に二つの訴訟に判決を下した。その二つの訴訟
とは、Hana Financial v. Hana Bank, and B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, 
Inc. である。Hana Financial v. Hana Bank の訴訟では、タッキングの方針を扱った。タッキ
ングの方針により、商標オーナーは以前のマークの使用の日付をその後に続く似たような、し
かし新しいマークに付加することによって、ある状況下において優先権を発動させることがで
きる。満場一致により、タッキングとは法律と事実の混ざり合った疑問であり、古い商標の使
用が似ているが新しいマークに付加して使えるかどうかの判決を下すのは、裁判所というより
も審判員の機能であると最高裁は考えた。B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. の訴
訟では争点排除の方針を扱った。争点排除の方針は、条件にもよるが、一つの裁判所によって
判決を下された争点を別の裁判所の前で再び議論することを禁じている。この判決での疑問
はTrademark Trial and Appeal Board によって下された判決は似たような混乱の争点の登録
を進める時に、地区の裁判所の前の侵害裁判の争点をあらかじめ排除する。７－２の大多数で、
最高裁は争点があらかじめ排除される必要な要素であるならば、再び争われることはできない
と考えた。この論文では、この二つの判決におけるアメリカ合衆国最高裁の意見と該当する法
律条項とを概観するものである。
